Modularity, flexibility, and the exploitation of autonomy should inform New Zealand’s maritime fleet renewal, writes maritime capability specialist and former Royal New Zealand Navy Officer Andrew Watts ONZM.

In an article that provides invaluable insight into the capability needed to implement a Pacific-centric defence strategy, Graeme Doull makes a number of points with which I completely agree, and some on which I have a different perspective. This article will hopefully continue the discussion and encourage more people to engage.

The first point on which I agree wholeheartedly with Graeme is the absolute need to avoid a “like for like” capability replacement focus. DCP25 talks about the replacement of the Anzac class frigates with “comparable, contemporary frigates”. Coupled with the intention to consider Australian solutions for capability requirements first, this suggests a possible inclination to join the Australian SEA3000 general purpose frigate programme.

However, the Mogami class frigate selected for SEA3000, although extremely capable, is a traditional non-modular warship design in which the mission systems are tightly coupled to the platform. Although it can operate a range of autonomous systems and is effective over the entire naval mission arc, it is only efficient over the combat arc, and at some point in its lifespan, it will require a highly expensive and technically risky midlife upgrade.

“There are definite grounds for making the exploitation of autonomy a central plank of the maritime fleet renewal strategy.”

The Australians will likely be able to afford this and may do it sooner rather than later to replace systems of Japanese origin with those in service in the rest of the RAN fleet. Our ability to follow suit may be problematic, leaving us with a range of sustainment challenges should our ships become orphans.

I’ve covered the generic ins and outs of modular as opposed to traditional naval capability many times in this and other journals, and I won’t repeat them here. Suffice to say that a modular combatant concept offers flexibility across the mission spectrum, including combat, and allows new technology to be inserted by replacing modules as opposed to taking an entire ship out of service for two and a half years.

Critically, modularity is the best way to exploit above water, surface, and under water autonomy. Autonomy is now mainstream, not pie in the sky. There are definite grounds for making the exploitation of autonomy a central plank of the maritime fleet renewal strategy.

The next point on which I agree strongly with Graeme relates to the centrality of the Pacific in our defence capability planning. As Graeme points out it is indeed an increasingly contested theatre, and our force structure must be capable of countering increasingly sophisticated threats to Pacific security.

To state the blindingly obvious, the Pacific is an oceanic space. But to paraphrase Sir Julian Corbett, navalists like me sometimes need to be reminded that people live on the land, not on the sea. Enabling land forces to project soft and hard power in the type of contingency that is now much more likely to arise than in the halcyon days when Helen Clark declared our geostrategic environment to be “incredibly benign” requires that naval and land capabilities be seamlessly integrated as a matter of course.

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I very strongly support Graeme’s recommendations about the types of land capability that should be deployable and sustainable by sea, and I fully agree that this must have a bearing on capability choices for maritime fleet renewal. In that context it is disappointing that DCP 25 makes such scant reference to sealift and force projection.

In making the above points about the integration of land and naval capability, I don’t downplay for an instant the indispensable contribution made by air and space capabilities to a Pacific centric strategy.

Success in modern warfare requires the best possible information concerning the areas in which our forces are operating to enable our people to make better decisions more quickly than their opponents – creating a condition known as decision advantage. Air, space, and the supporting intelligence and information networking capabilities are essential to this. Graeme’s points about airlift, including the need for airlift to access short and unimproved runways, are also highly germane.

Graeme offers the Royal Navy’s Multi Role Strike Ship (MRSS) as an exemplar for possible naval capability direction. I agree, up to a point. The MRSS is shaping up to be a highly sophisticated, and thus highly expensive, capability. If it were to be the centrepiece of our fleet, we would need at least three to ensure the availability of one at high readiness for operations. The cost might therefore crowd out the other capabilities that the fleet needs to be fully effective across the spectrum, including the “right sized” capabilities that we need for engagement with our Pacific partners (on which more below).

In addition, the relationship with Australia is a cornerstone of our defence policy, as governments of every political stripe have made clear in policy statements for many years. This requires capability that is credible to and valued by the Australians, who place a high premium on capability that allows sea control in the regions to the north of Australia.

Australian doctrine requires “maritime manoeuvre” capability to project land forces in that region, partly to support sea control with land based maritime weapons. MRSS could provide useful support to that concept. But the overriding requirement is for naval and air combat power, and even if heavily armed relative to other amphibious capability, MRSS does not score highly on that point. Modular surface combatants able to field sophisticated anti-submarine sensors, ant-ship missiles, naval helicopters, and a range of autonomous capabilities would score more highly – as would the SEA3000 frigate.

Royal Navy MRSS Concept – Artist’s Rendering. Image: UK Defence Ministry.

If we were to adopt an MRSS-like concept, there might be options that allow a greater focus on autonomy, including the modified San Giusto design offered by Italian company Fincantieri. In this design the flight deck runs the length of the ship like an aircraft carrier, providing a more flexible crewed and autonomous aviation platform. In addition, the modified San Giusto design incorporates frigate type combat capabilities, including a medium calibre gun, an area air defence missile system, and advanced active electronically scanned phased array radar. These capabilities are highly synergistic with the land capabilities that Graeme advocates for integration with naval sealift. The floodable well dock that it has in common with MRSS can deploy boats and landing craft and towed array sonar.

All these capabilities are expensive (although cost could be reduced by scaling back capability) but a platform that combined meaningful combat and sealift capability would obviate the requirement to acquire separate platforms for each function – but would only be viable if at least three were acquired.

“A modular IPV replacement opens up a range of opportunities for New Zealand and Australian defence and marine industry.”

There are some significant challenges with the San Giusto, however. The main one is that in its present form, it is too small for our needs. Its flight deck can accommodate NH90/SH60R sized aircraft, but its hangar cannot. It is technically possible to enlarge any ship design, but the costs of doing so should not be underestimated. It can, however, embark a company group sized army unit and its supporting equipment, in continuation of one of Graeme’s themes.

Another significant challenge is that the San Giusto is based around European platform and mission systems not in service with our closer partners. However, if we could build a satisfactory relationship with the Italian Navy, this would not be insoluble. On official visits to the Italian Ministry of Defence and the Fincantieri shipyard in 2018, I formed the conclusion that these are people we can definitely work with.

Modified San Giusto Class LPD in service with the Qatari Emiri Naval Forces. Image: Ficantieri.

The Inshore Patrol Vessels (IPV) HMNZ Ships Taupo and Hawea have made extended deployments to Fiji, and a team deployed the Ocius Bluebottle autonomous surface vessel to Fiji for maritime surveillance. Over the course of nearly 15 years’ service at sea in the frigates of the RNZN including many deployments to the Pacific, some in Command, I formed a view that the visit of a large combatant serves to emphasise the difference between ourselves and Pacific nations, not just in capability, but in worldview. This address by the Prime Minister of Fiji to the Fijian Parliament may be germane.

The IPV and Bluebottle deployments, on the other hand, have been highly successful, in part perhaps because they have been sustained over long periods allowing RNZN people to form close friendships and working relationships with their Fijian counterparts. More importantly perhaps, our Pacific partners can see the relevance of capabilities on this scale to their security needs and are thus likely to be comfortable working alongside (and often aboard) them.

The Bluebottle capability is a natural fit for Pacific partnerships, but interdiction capability is also required, which means finding eventual replacements for the IPV. A modular platform in the same size range as the IPV (55m LOA) would be ideal. It would be able to perform all current IPV missions while also offering flexibility for hydrography, expeditionary reconnaissance, diving support, mine countermeasures and possibly even low intensity combat.

In the latter role they could provide essential force protection to an MRSS or LPD on passage and in the littorals, while the larger ship carried payload modules enabling the IPV replacement to be re-purposed while deployed.

A modular IPV replacement opens up a range of opportunities for New Zealand and Australian defence and marine industry.

I was employed as a consultant by Austal Ltd in 2023/24, and I had considerable exposure to the depth of naval architecture, systems integration, and shipbuilding skill and capability that Australian government investment in local capacity has created. Austal is a world leader in multi-hull design and construction, mainly in the fast commercial and military transport sectors, but there is no doubt that this could be translated into a highly effective modular small combatant of the type outlined above. Austal shipyard capacity in the Philippines and Vietnam could be used, while a commercial eco-system featuring systems integrators and Australian and New Zealand suppliers could design, build, and sustain these ships in service.

Our Asian partner navies have long standing requirements for large numbers of small combatants to ensure adequate presence in their maritime areas of interest. A small modular combatant could attract interest from these partners, creating export opportunities for the concept and design, allowing fabrication and testing in-country.

The thinking outlined by Graeme Doull in his article dovetails neatly with my own, notwithstanding differences in detail. A force structure along the lines outlined above, consisting of three MRSS/Enhanced San Giusto LPDs and four to five small modular combatants, could address the naval aspects of the capability needs he identifies. It would be great to know what others think…