New Zealand Defence has just procured a capability in insufficient numbers due to budget constraints, and this leaves the NZDF with little resilience, writes former New Zealand Army Officer Graeme Doull.

The decision to acquire the MH-60R Seahawk to replace the RNZN’s aging Seasprite helicopters is, on face value, a sound one. It aligns New Zealand with Australia, strengthens interoperability with our only ally, and provides the Navy with a proven and capable platform.

The question, however, is not what we bought—but how many. How did we end up with only five aircraft? This number appears unsustainable and provides the RNZN little resilience.

Following Australia – with exceptions

The 2025 Defence Capability Plan (DCP) rightly emphasises that New Zealand should procure the same equipment as Australia wherever possible. I support this principle. Interoperability with the ADF is critical.

“If we cannot afford the required number of platforms, the options are simple: either increase funding or reduce per-unit cost.”

But in my view, there should be two exceptions.

First, in some cases, complementary rather than identical capabilities may provide greater utility. For example, lighter armoured vehicles might better suit Pacific operations than the heavier vehicles in the Australian inventory.

Second, there are instances where New Zealand can’t get a good deal, or where we simply cannot afford to sustain a capability at the same level. It is these issues — price and value — that deserves closer examination.

Leveraging Australian Procurement

If New Zealand is to adopt the same platforms as Australia, we should expect to buy at the same price and under comparable terms. The only way to ensure this is to overcome the tired excuse of “commercial sensitivity” and insist on adopting Australian procurement agreements, with only minor modifications for jurisdictional or operational differences.

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When we publicly signal an intent to buy the same equipment as Australia we risk weakening our negotiating position. Without competitive tension, we could become price takers—entirely dependent on vendor goodwill.

Australia has both scale and capacity. They run competitive tenders that drive down price and create value. New Zealand should leverage their process by using the already agreed access to combined procurement to use the agreements that Australia has already secured.

For vendors, this is efficient and cost-effective, as it streamlines the procurement process. For us, it ensures compatibility and a fair price.

There are only two parties to the procurement process, and the corresponding commercial sensitivity. Australia has already agreed to combined procurement with us. If a supplier were to refuse to disclose the Australian terms under the guise of “commercial sensitivity,” it should serve as a clear warning: they are not committed to delivering value to the NZDF – and we should look elsewhere.

When the Budget Doesn’t Stretch

Even with best-practice procurement, with effective direct negotiation based on the ADF contracts, there are times when New Zealand simply cannot afford the same per unit cost as Australia. We need to face reality. Sometimes the budget is the budget.

Historically, Defence has been guilty of buying as many units as the budget allows, regardless of whether the number procured is sustainable, or needed: 105 NZLAVs purchased to match the funding envelope rather than any operational requirement; two ANZAC frigates when three or four were needed; and now, it appears, five Seahawks when eight would have been more appropriate.

This is a flawed approach. Buying fewer units to fit a budget leads to orphaned capabilities — platforms that cannot be sustained, and fleets that lack resilience.  Instead, we must be intentional. If we cannot afford the required number of platforms, the options are simple: either increase funding or reduce per-unit cost. 

That might mean accepting lower-specification variants or choosing alternative platforms altogether.  We should avoid the classic ‘fitted for but not with’ NZDF solution where bolt-on capabilities are intended to be added later — this approach results in critical gaps in the professional development of service personnel, especially from an ongoing maintenance sustainment perspective.

The Missed Opportunity

The decision to adopt Australian equipment is sensible and pragmatic. But to extract value from this strategy, we must leverage Australian procurement processes and insist on cost parity.

When budgets fall short, we must make deliberate choices — either find more funding or lower specifications — to ensure we buy enough units to be viable.

I wasn’t in the room when the decision to acquire only five Seahawks was made, and I am unable to offer an informed view on the price. The deal may have been fantastic. But from the outside, it appears to be yet another example of New Zealand Defence procuring a capability in insufficient numbers due to budget constraints.

The result is predictable: a warm feeling from a targeted capability being delivered but it exposes the cold reality – a lack of resilience in the NZDF.