With 99.7 percent of trade moving by sea, should NZ buy $12 billion Japanese frigates or lower-cost drones? It’s a false choice, they’re part and parcel.

Comment: Last year, in the western Indian Ocean, the Indian Navy frigate INS Tarkash intercepted a dhow (trading vessel) carrying more than 2.5 tonnes of heroin and hashish, a haul valued at NZ$181 million. The interception was conducted as part of a New Zealand-led task force that included HMNZS Te Kaha. It was partnership in its most practical form with intelligence shared, ships deployed, and results delivered.

That was the backdrop in Auckland on July 11, when Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and PM Christopher Luxon endorsed a Roadmap to 2030 that includes closer maritime cooperation and elevated the relationship to a Strategic Partnership. It formed part of a cluster of July announcements suggesting New Zealand’s long-discussed defence reset was beginning to move from policy into practice.

Five days later, New Zealand and Fiji renewed the Duavata Partnership, emphasising the Pacific as an Ocean of Peace. Wellington is also exploring membership of the Fiji-Australia Ocean of Peace Alliance, a mutual-defence treaty intended to deepen Pacific-led security cooperation. On July 22, New Zealand and Papua New Guinea signed a defence statement covering dialogue, training, exercises and personnel exchanges.

But the test is no longer whether Wellington can announce partnerships. It is whether those partnerships can be converted into deployable capability.

Looming over these developments is China’s rapid military expansion and increasingly assertive behaviour across the Indo-Pacific, compounded by deepening, if uneven, strategic cooperation among Beijing, Moscow, Tehran, and Pyongyang. Their growing diplomatic, economic and military ties are making regional crises more interconnected and adding to the pressure on New Zealand and its partners.

carrying more than 2.5 tonnes of heroin and hashish, a haul valued at NZ$181 million. The interception was conducted as part of a New Zealand-led task force that included HMNZS Te Kaha. It was partnership in its most practical form with intelligence shared, ships deployed, and results delivered.

That was the backdrop in Auckland on July 11, when Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and PM Christopher Luxon endorsed a Roadmap to 2030 that includes closer maritime cooperation and elevated the relationship to a Strategic Partnership. It formed part of a cluster of July announcements suggesting New Zealand’s long-discussed defence reset was beginning to move from policy into practice.

Five days later, New Zealand and Fiji renewed the Duavata Partnership, emphasising the Pacific as an Ocean of Peace. Wellington is also exploring membership of the Fiji-Australia Ocean of Peace Alliance, a mutual-defence treaty intended to deepen Pacific-led security cooperation. On July 22, New Zealand and Papua New Guinea signed a defence statement covering dialogue, training, exercises and personnel exchanges.

But the test is no longer whether Wellington can announce partnerships. It is whether those partnerships can be converted into deployable capability.

Looming over these developments is China’s rapid military expansion and increasingly assertive behaviour across the Indo-Pacific, compounded by deepening, if uneven, strategic cooperation among Beijing, Moscow, Tehran, and Pyongyang. Their growing diplomatic, economic and military ties are making regional crises more interconnected and adding to the pressure on New Zealand and its partners.

New Zealand’s robust diplomacy is being matched, at least in part, by capability investment. Budget 2026 funded drone systems, critical ship maintenance and naval fleet renewal. The Defence Force is buying and trialling air, land and sea systems, including surveillance and one-way attack drones. Work on frigate replacement has narrowed its initial focus to Japan’s upgraded Mogami class and Britain’s Type 31, although no decision has been made.

These moves follow the 2025 Defence Capability Plan, which seeks a combat-capable force, a greater ability to operate with partners, and a closer role as a force multiplier with Australia.

Yet partnership declarations and procurement studies matter only if they produce forces that can deploy and fight.

The timing underlines the urgency. On July 6, a Chinese submarine launched a strategic missile carrying a dummy warhead into the Pacific. At the Nato Ankara Summit, defence ministers from Japan, Australia and New Zealand expressed concern and described China’s expanding military activities as a serious issue for the international community. The South Pacific, clearly, is no longer beyond major-power military competition.

For an island trading nation, maritime security is not peripheral. Some 99.7 percent of New Zealand’s trade by volume moves by sea, while its Exclusive Economic Zone covers about 4m sq km. The ocean is a source of prosperity and a point of exposure. Secure shipping routes and undersea communications cannot be taken for granted.

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Yet the New Zealand Defence Force carries the legacy of decades of under-investment. The Government plans to lift defence spending from just over 1 percent to more than 2 percent of GDP within eight years, backed by $12 billion over four years. At the Shangri-La Dialogue, US Secretary of War Pete Hegseth called 2 percent “freeloading” and urged allies towards 3.5 percent. Whatever one thinks of his rhetoric, the underlying point – that partnerships cannot substitute for credible national capacity – is difficult to dismiss.

Finance Minister Nicola Willis is right that New Zealand does not have billions of dollars sitting under the couch. Fiscal constraints are real. But scarcity is an argument for sharper priorities, not delay. New Zealand must spend intelligently and use partnerships to share training, maintenance and support costs.

The Government’s interest in the upgraded Mogami class is therefore worth serious examination. It is not an automatic choice, and the Type 31 remains under consideration. But a common platform with Australia could turn a necessary replacement into a wider strategic advantage.

New Zealand relies on HMNZS Te Kaha and HMNZS Te Mana, commissioned in 1997 and 1999, for its primary maritime combat capability. Their replacement is identified for the 2029-39 period, with advice on next steps expected to reach Cabinet before the end of next year. The decision will shape the navy’s reach, crewing and partnerships for decades.

The upgraded Mogami has a range of up to 10,000 nautical miles, a 32-cell missile-launch system, capacity to operate an MH-60R maritime combat helicopter and a crew of about 92. For a small population with vast maritime responsibilities, automation and reduced crewing are substantial advantages.

There is, however, an emerging debate over whether New Zealand should acquire new frigates at all. Former Army officer Graeme Doull argues that lower-cost drones, autonomous underwater vehicles and modular multirole ships could provide greater mass, flexibility and everyday utility than high-end frigates.

But the choice between frigates and drones is a false one. Autonomous systems are most effective when paired with crewed platforms that provide the endurance, command-and-control, maintenance and logistics needed to operate them at range. Japan may offer New Zealand not merely a replacement frigate, but entry into an Australia-Japan maritime ecosystem built around interoperable ships, autonomous systems, shared sustainment and long-term operational expertise.

Australia has contracted for its first three upgraded Mogamis, with the first due in 2029 and later ships planned for construction in Western Australia. A New Zealand purchase could align training, maintenance, software, spare parts and exercises across three navies, while bringing Wellington closer to a democratic G7 power central to the Free and Open Indo-Pacific. This would diversify New Zealand’s security ties without displacing Australia as its indispensable ally.

Japan’s April 2026 revision of its defence-export rules makes such cooperation more plausible, but not automatic. Transfers still require case-by-case approval, and New Zealand does not yet have a defence equipment-transfer agreement with Japan. The information-security agreement entered into force in March, while the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement is due to enter into force on August 15. Any frigate deal would still require negotiation and approval.

New Zealand’s defence reset is under way, but announcements are easier than delivery. Regional partners can strengthen New Zealand’s resilience, yet none can substitute for forces able to patrol, deter, assist and operate alongside them. Diplomacy remains essential; without credible capability behind it, its effect is limited.

For too long, New Zealand has treated defence as a cost to defer and distance as a strategy. Neither assumption survives the current environment. We now need clear priorities, timely decisions, and a force capable of turning partnerships into action.