After taking some time to reflect on the Defence Capability Plan (DCP) 2025, I am generally supportive of its direction and content. I agree with Judith Collins' characterization of it as a beginning — “the floor, not the ceiling” — and the analogy that the NZDF has moved “out of intensive care and into the ward.” However, much more remains to be done.

One critical issue that must be addressed is the historical pattern of “start-stop” and inconsistent commitment to defence projects. This cycle not only delays progress but drives up costs considerably. Without a comprehensive, bipartisan strategic vision, we risk continuing this costly and destabilizing trend.

The 2025 DCP largely represents an updated continuation of the 2019 plan, which itself built upon the foundations of the previous government’s $20 billion over 15-year defence investment program under John Key. The current government's plan to increase defence spending by $12 billion to reach 2% of GDP is essentially fulfilling that earlier vision.

A notable difference, however, is the increased focus on strike capabilities across land, sea, and air domains. This includes finally acquiring medium-to-long range anti-ship missiles for the Navy, arming the P-8A Poseidon aircraft, and "exploring" land-based missile systems. It is long overdue to formally acknowledge the shortfalls in our defensive capabilities — concerns that many within the defence community, myself included, have raised for years.

In particular, the rapid integration of the Naval Strike Missile (NSM) onto the existing Anzac-class frigates should be prioritized. These upgrades, coupled with integration into the CMS330 combat system and thorough testing, will provide the Royal New Zealand Navy with genuine standoff strike capabilities for the first time. At present, the Navy relies on the short-range Penguin missile launched from Seasprite helicopters — effective only against lightly armed vessels and unsuitable against more capable threats.

Another key focus area is the introduction of unmanned systems — drones for both surveillance and, potentially, strike missions — informed by lessons from the ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine. Importantly, it has been emphasized that a human operator will always remain in the decision-making loop for any strike actions involving drones.

Nevertheless, alongside investment in new equipment, persistent issues such as NZDF personnel attrition must be addressed concurrently. Having modern technology is meaningless without the trained personnel to operate and maintain it.

Some question why New Zealand should maintain a capable defence force given our geographical isolation. However, defence is not solely about direct threats to our shores; it is about protecting our trade routes, supporting allies, and providing humanitarian assistance in the Pacific region. Over 90% of our goods arrive by sea, making the protection of maritime trade lanes vital for our economy and way of life.

Few realise that under our obligations, if Australia is attacked, New Zealand can declare war without needing parliamentary approval — a unique exception to our normal constitutional processes. Moreover, our responsibilities extend to the defence and support of Pacific nations such as the Cook Islands, Tokelau, and Niue.

It is important to reiterate: defence is one of the few core functions that governments are obligated to provide. Health, education, housing, and social programs, while essential to a thriving society, are not constitutional imperatives and could, in theory, be privatized — defence cannot. Currently, health, education, and social support consume approximately 45% of the national budget, while defence spending remains between 1.1% and 1.3% of GDP. The proposed increase to 2% over eight years is, relatively speaking, a modest investment.

READ MORE

• Multi-billion dollar Defence plan unveiled
• Defence Force spend-up: Who is it meant to protect us against, and other questions
• $12 billion on defence? I'm good with that
• New Zealand navy receives a boost under 2025 Defence Capability Plan

What is in the plan?

Increased strike capability.

The cornerstone of the DCP is an enhanced strike capability.

What does this mean, for our non-military informed readers; this means the NZDF will gain the ability not just to detect and defend against incoming threats (such as missiles), but to respond at greater distances, thereby neutralizing threats before they can launch multiple attacks. Presently, New Zealand lacks this capability, leaving our naval vessels and forces exposed.

Giving increased strike capability means we have a chance of hitting the hostile before they hit us, it is that simple. Currently we (the NZDF) cannot do this) This means anti-ship missiles with greater range and accuracy. This may also cover sea land and air-based systems, meaning better missile systems on the frigates, arming the P-8a’s Poseidon’s and possibly getting land-based missile systems.

Now all this said, both the current and successive governments must follow through with this plan and that has always been a crux of the matter. However, in general the current opposition agrees with the plan in principle.

From the DCP

Enhanced strike capabilities

What it is: The NZDF will improve its combat capability by enhancing its strike capabilities, particularly in the maritime domain and at longer range. Options include arming existing air and maritime platforms with missiles, such as the P-8A Poseidon fleet and the Anzac frigates or exploring other option, including land-based strike.

Why it is important: Strike capabilities provide a deterrent against vessels threatening New Zealand’s territory or NZDF units deployed on operations. To enhance interoperability, Defence will explore acquiring the same capabilities as Australia or partners, who are enhancing their capabilities in this area.

Australia currently use ESSM and Harpoon, and soon they will shift to the Naval Strike Missile and retire the aging Harpoon missile. New Zealand uses CAMM and the short-range Penguin missile launched from the Sea Sprite. Four different systems. It would make sense to use the same. NSM and ESSM, however I would keep the Penguin ASM for the replacement helos as they have only just been re-engined and will give that extra capability for another 20 years or so.

Drones: sea, land and air, however, are they strike drones or just surveillance drones. Well, the main focus is surveillance, but they are also open to the strike capabilities of a drone as part of the overall “Enhanced strike capabilities” criteria. Of course there is the thought of AI, however the MoD, NZDF have stated that there will always be a human in the loop of a strike drone especially with the go, no go situation.

The up arming of the NZDF artillery is an other capability that needs looked at, again from replacing the 105’s with the larger 155’s adding the said strike drones, as well as talk of exploring the idea of land-based strike missiles systems. This also includes the upgrading of our current javelin missiles to the latest version.

Replacement of the Maritime Helicopters

The SH-2G(i) helos are an aging platform are fast approaching the end of their life. Whilst the obvious choice would be the MH-60R Sea Hawk (a maritime version of the Black Hawk) Due to Australia having this platform therefore we can tap into their experience, supply lines, and cross services and country training.

But there are a few this that have been thrown into the works in today geopolitical world. That huge spanner is Trump and I don’t need to say any more on that.

That being said there are other options:

• The AgustaWestland AW159 Wildcat.
• The NHI NFH-90 (Maritime version of the NH-90).
• AgustaWestland AW101.
• MH-60R Sea Hawk.

Although there were some corruption claims with the South Korean WildCat deal;

• https://sites.tufts.edu/corruptarmsdeals/south-koreas-aw-159-helicopters/
• https://m.economictimes.com/news/defence/agusta-westland-vvip-chopper-scam-all-about-indias-biggest-defence-scam-after-bofors-what-sc-said-about-it/amp_articleshow/108591961.cms

There are obviously other options like the Eurocopter EC725 etc. However, my thought process here is also thinking of when we replace HMNZS Canterbury with a say a proper LPD or small LHD that requires multiple helo’s we need a helo that can do ASW, Anti-Ship, Search & Rescue, Troop Transport into a hot zone and even special/black ops, as well as the general utility work that a naval helo does in standard naval operations.

The replacement of the B757’s I am unsure, but Airbus, Boeing, Embraer all have great aircraft that can fulfil the role.  But at least get three maybe even four air frames. There is a bit of a misconception with the role of the B757 and thy can carry.

In the late 1970s the New Zealand Government identified the need to supplement No. 40 Squadron’s fleet of Lockheed Hercules with additional aircraft for long range transport operations. Before the B757 we had the B727's doing similar work. However the 757s converted to 757-200M's Combi were a major upgrade in strategic air lift capability. The two Boeing 757-200 were received in 2003. Modifications commencing in 2007 saw the aircraft fitted with an upper deck cargo door to facilitate an 11-pallet cargo capability (C-130j-30 can take about 8) , strengthened floor in order to carry large and heavy cargo, internal air stairs, upgraded engines and flight deck enhancements including full compliance with current global air navigation specifications and standards. The B757 is suited for long-range, strategic airlift, transporting large numbers of troops or cargo over considerable distances including the ice-covered Pegasus Field near New Zealand's Scott Base in McMurdo Sound, Antarctica. While the C-130 can do troop transport, in to on unprepared strips and around the lslands which the the B757 requires a prepared runway, the B757's can carry more troops than a C-130J. For example, a 757 could transport 160 troops for a PRT rotation, while a C-130J typically carries 128 ground troops or 94 paratroopers. C-130J Max payload weight 21 tonnes verses the B757 22.5 tonnes. The 757 also has the advantage of flying faster and further than the C-130J-30, offering greater flexibility in troop deployment and in a bit of comfort compared to the Herc... And those that have flown in a C-130 know what I am talking about.

One or two area’s NZ is short on is air to air refueling and early warning we should invest in a couple of tankers like the Airbus A330 Multi Role Tanker Transport (MRTT) which can be configured for either transport of troops and gear or as a tanker if you have 4 air frames at least one or two can be flying in either mode or configuration. Again, Australia operates this aircraft.

Also in the early warning arena, again what the Australians use the Boeing E-7 Wedgetail but there are again, other options, for this from Europe. People will ask why we would need this capability when we have the P-8a. Well, the P-8 is mainly anti-submarine and designed to hunt and kill submarines. The E-7 on the other hand is early warning gives a picture of surface and air contacts which the P-8a can’t really do on the same level. If you want surveillance that has long range detection, this is it.

I still believe we need a larger transport aircraft and as we missed out on the few white tails C-17 III Globemasters there are a couple of options for this as well like the Airbus A400m and whilst I was originally against the idea due to it was still being developed and had issues like every aircraft have during development, it is now starting prove it’s worth over the European space. The other option here is the Kawaski C-2.

Finally, we need to get a couple of extra P-8a’s, 4 was never enough, even Defence Minister Ron Mark at the time wanted at least 5 but the treasury said no and here we are again with a smaller force of four air frames and trying to cover the same thing six P-3K2's did.