The recently released 2025 Defence Capability Plan (DCP) focuses largely on replacing existing assets but offers little genuine change. Rather than addressing New Zealand’s long-term defence requirements, it reads like a compromise between competing Services’ bids, mediated by bureaucrats, and assembled to meet the Government’s desire to increase military spending.

The Plan’s reliance on like-for-like replacement reflects decades of chronic underinvestment, but more worryingly, it suggests a lack of rigorous strategic analysis about the NZDF’s future roles and the capabilities we will most likely need.

As a once-in-a-generation opportunity, the DCP should be far more than a procurement list. It demands robust analysis — about geography, the evolving security context, the nature of future conflict, and how New Zealand can best operate alongside partners. Anything less risks wasting billions while leaving our forces ill-prepared for the challenges ahead.

“The Pacific is rapidly emerging as a contested theatre. China’s military expansion, its growing influence among Pacific Island nations, and the United States’ and NATO’s pivot to the Indo-Pacific are transforming the region from quiet backwater to strategic flashpoint.”

So how did we get here?

The DCP is the third in a series of documents, building on the Defence Policy and Strategy Statement 2023 (DPSS) and the Future Force Design Principles 2023 (FFDP).

The DPSS laid out three interlinked pillars — Understand, Partner, Act — aimed at navigating our complex security environment, particularly in the Pacific, but also more broadly around the world. It was a solid starting point, but arguably too high-level to provide real direction. It did not unpack in any real detail the implications of the geography of the Pacific, the nature of likely threats, or the detail of how we would operate alongside partners.

The FFDP added even less. Intended to be a bridge between policy and procurement, it delivered little more than vague concepts with sliding scales from low to high to illustrate the ‘desired policy setting’ — ‘flexibility’ set to ‘medium’, and ‘concurrency’ set to ‘medium high’, for example. Disappointingly, it failed to articulate meaningful principles with which to shape capability decisions – perhaps explaining the lack of clear intent in the DCP.

Proposed alternative principles

To fill the void left by the FFDP, I have proposed five alternative principles, along with their rationales. These could more meaningfully focus capability development, and a framework like this could help develop a more cohesive and aligned fit-for-purpose view of required capabilities for the NZDF:

1. The Pacific Is the next theatre of conflict — this must drive every decision

The Pacific is rapidly emerging as a contested theatre. China’s military expansion, its growing influence among Pacific Island nations, and the United States’ and NATO’s pivot to the Indo-Pacific are transforming the region from quiet backwater to strategic flashpoint. Militarisation by Australia, the US, and China is accelerating, while fragile Pacific states are becoming prizes in this competition.

“Given our reliance on the US and Australia at sea and in the air, the question becomes: how best can New Zealand contribute?”

Hybrid tactics — cyber-attacks, political interference, economic coercion — amplify these dynamics. With the South China Sea heavily fortified, the less congested Pacific offers a more attractive arena for influence and power projection. Whoever secures footholds here will control vital logistics hubs and access valuable mineral and fisheries resources.

A future Pacific war will not resemble Afghanistan, Malaya, Vietnam, or Korea. It will be fought across kinetic, cyber, and information domains, with contested communications and disinformation campaigns as significant as artillery and ships.

Geography alone demands a rethink: small ports, grass runways, poor roads, and vast maritime distances. Sea control is paramount, and forces must be agile, logistically self-reliant, and designed for operations far from home. Maintaining current assets like the NZLAV makes little sense — they are too large for Bougainville’s or East Timor’s roads and cannot be deployed by Hercules in combat-ready form.

A Pacific-focused force would not preclude us from contributing further afield, but our priority must be our own neighbourhood.

NZLAVs. Image: NZDF.

2. Where we lack capability, we should rely on our natural partners

A credible defence strategy must prepare for a spectrum of conflict, from civil disorder to high-intensity war. Early stages will likely involve foreign-backed unrest and provocations. The NZDF must be able to support civil authorities, protect infrastructure, defend against cyber-attacks, and counter disinformation. As conflict escalates, roles would shift to targeted strikes, humanitarian assistance, and bolstering local forces.

In full-scale war, New Zealand would almost certainly fight alongside Australia and the US — or not at all. Australia has advanced aircraft, armour, and ships, and the US still dominates global power projection.

By contrast, New Zealand has no strike aircraft, and re-establishing that capability — say with F-35s — would exceed the DCP budget. Our independent naval combat capability is also limited with lone frigates highly vulnerable without allied support. Air superiority and naval dominance in the Pacific will depend on the US and Australia, not us — we simply lack the assets and expertise to do this ourselves.

“In the Ukraine, drones now account for approximately 70 percent of casualties and yet the NZ Army does not currently operate First Person View (FPV) drones. “

3. Where we do build capability, we should lead for our partners – both larger and smaller

Given our reliance on the US and Australia at sea and in the air, the question becomes: how best can New Zealand contribute?

Australian equipment is effective for defence on their mainland but is too large for Pacific deployment. Abrams tanks, ASLAV, Bushmasters, and Hawkeis are all bus sized vehicles that would struggle on narrow jungle roads and light bridges. Vehicles of this size would also damage existing roads and, consequently, critical relationships with local populations.

US logistics are unmatched, but depend on deep ports and long runways, both scarce in the Pacific. These gaps highlight where New Zealand should invest: vehicles, ships, and capabilities specifically tailored to Pacific conditions.

Just as there are times when we will need to rely on larger partners for support, we should be building capabilities to support our smaller partners too. We should purposefully design our forces to act as a combat multiplier for our military partners by ensuring we can provide logistics, communications, engineering, and indirect fires for them — in addition to our forces.

New Zealand Bushmasters. Image: NZDF.

4. Operational capabilities must have resilience and redundancy

Any deployable capability requires a cycle of preparation, deployment, and reconstitution. Sustained operations therefore demand three of any given asset — at a minimum. For example, to keep one frigate continuously at sea, we would need at least three.

Our experience has proven that personnel-dependent capabilities, such as infantry forces or ship crews, require even greater depth. This is where Reserve Forces should play a key role — ideally mirroring the regular force structure, one-for-one, to sustain operations and replace depleted units.

Too many of our current capabilities lack this resilience. We must invest intentionally to address the shortfall, and where true redundancy cannot be achieved, we should consider abandoning the capability altogether rather than creating unrealistic expectations.

5. Unless there is a compelling reason – we should procure the same equipment as our partners

New Zealand has an unfortunate history of pursuing bespoke solutions that create potential headaches in sustainment and interoperability. The recent decision to diverge from Australia in moving away from the IW Steyr, for example, potentially increases costs and complexity for future deployments.

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Consistent with the DCP’s recommendations, wherever practical, we should procure the same platforms as our partners — simplifying logistics, deepening integration, and reducing costs. Exceptions should only be made where Pacific-specific needs demand it, or in circumstances where the Australian solution offers exceptionally poor value.

Applying these principles, how might the DCP look different?

Logistics by sea is key to the Pacific

Fit-for-purpose logistics must be the foundation of any Pacific strategy. In this theatre, logistics means ships — ideally multi-role vessels like HMNZS Canterbury. While not built to full naval standards, and with lessons learnt that would certainly be incorporated in future builds, at around $170m each (inflation-adjusted) they are far cheaper than frigates (around $1b). They are versatile enough for shallow ports and landing operations, yet still large enough to provide meaningful support.

To ensure redundancy and resilience, we would need sufficient numbers — perhaps six vessels of this class — allowing ships to be in transit and loiter to support operations. Such a fleet would not only fill a gap for our larger partners but also meet critical needs for Pacific Island nations.

Ships like HMNZS Canterbury offer landing platforms for aerial drones, davits and ramps for launching sea drones, and sufficient space to accommodate drone operators to support these systems. Advances in modular missile technology mean that, in future, such ships could also be fitted with a wider range of offensive and defensive weapon systems.

Warships are evolving. While sleek, heavily armed frigates and destroyers will remain the backbone of major navies for escorting fast task groups in high-threat environments, broader sea control is increasingly expected to fall to slower and more versatile vessels capable of operating a range of drones (such as the UK’s Multi-Role Strike Ship (MRSS) program). For New Zealand, the most valuable contribution to US–Australian sea operations may be to focus on building and deploying more of these adaptable multi-role workhorse warships.

HMNZS Canterbury off Samoa. Image: NZDF.

Mobility assets sized for Pacific operations

NZDF transport assets (landing craft, helicopters, and genuinely light armoured vehicles) should, by design, be chosen to suit the Pacific’s geography (and whatever vessels we choose to deploy). Finding the right fit will be challenging, as even the relatively light, ubiquitous Humvee has too wide a wheelbase to be fit for purpose.

Operating in the Pacific, we should look for something that can handle tracks normally used only by a Toyota Hilux. An armoured Landcruiser, similar to the twelve vehicles recently donated by the ADF to the Papua New Guinea Defence Force — essentially a lighter, less protected ‘light MRAP’ — could potentially fill this niche. Due to their huge size, nothing in the current Australian catalogue of armoured vehicles is suitable.

Ready-reaction forces should be deployable by Hercules, which should remain the mainstay of our tactical airlift capability. The Hercules’ cargo hold dimensions must be a key consideration when procuring vehicles — if they can’t operate directly off the ramp, they should be ruled out.

To match the short grass landing strips common in the Pacific, lighter fixed-wing aircraft, such as the C-27 Spartan, could also provide tactical airlift and logistics support. This would align with the ADF fleet and enhance Pacific focused capability.

Winning the information, cyberwar and remotely fought battlespace

Cultural, cyber, and information warfare capabilities are force multipliers. The NZDF, with its historical and demographic advantages in Pacific relationships, must be able to influence the information environment through traditional and social media, backed by strong cyber tools. This should be underpinned by a near-constant peacetime presence in the Pacific — building infrastructure, providing aid, and cultivating trust.

Half of the multi-role fleet should be deployed at any time to ensure we are seen as a part of the community of Pacific Nations, not an outsider. These vessels should also host NZ land force units which, while training and acclimatising themselves, should be developing capability and building a depth of relationships with Pacific Island Country forces.

There is a new king of the battlefield – the low-cost drone. In the Ukraine, drones now account for approximately 70 percent of casualties and yet the NZ Army does not currently operate First Person View (FPV) drones.

The NZDF is unprepared for the remotely fought battlespace. Drone warfare — both offensive and defensive — must become a core competency at all levels and domains, with systems ranging from cheap disposables to long-endurance tactical platforms like the Bayraktar.

If the frigates are retired, maintaining some form of strategic strike using a platform such as Anduril’s Ghost Shark maritime drone would be prudent. The Ghost Shark, while less versatile, offers comparable lethality and improved survivability versus a frigate, and, at around $25m each, are a fraction of the cost.

Bayraktar TB2 SİHA. Image: Baykar.

Kinetic warfare is still fundamental in the Pacific

Kinetic warfighting fundamentals still matter – seizing and holding ground, repelling attack, and delivering indirect fire. These capabilities must be adapted to Pacific geography and the littoral environment.

New Zealand’s soldiers should be confident in a marine environment — familiar with small boats, landing craft, and operating around water. Likewise, indirect fire support should be ready to operate on Pacific roads and tracks. This may mean a more mobile tube artillery system, like the Scorpion 120mm mortar, which can be deployed from a light vehicle and moved without digging out a base plate – may possibly be a better fit than the existing L119 light gun.

The New Zealand Army recently announced it is merging two of its three manoeuvre units because it does not have enough soldiers to sustain them, yet it can still justify having hundreds of senior officers. These manoeuvre units are the only way to deliver the fundamentals of kinetic warfighting and the reduction of the Army’s ability to do battle by a third represents the biggest drop in combat capability since the disbandment of the Air Force’s Strike Wing.

This merger seems ill timed given the Government’s public commitment to increase Defence spending. Even without the increase in spending, surely, it would be wiser to release headcount from senior officers’ roles to reinvest in combat units.

Scorpion 120mm mortar. Image: Global Ordnance.

Cohesive, scalable force packages

Bringing this all together – a ‘Canterbury-class’ vessel (or perhaps an even more capable ship around her size) carrying an infantry company reinforced with what would normally amount to a battalion group’s worth of additional capabilities could be an exceptionally powerful and flexible force package. In addition to an infantry company, this type of force would ideally include:

A headquarters company (command post, signals, military police, civil affairs, media/ communications, intelligence, and training/liaison functions);
A reconnaissance squadron (with aerial drones, and wheeled, boat-mounted, and dismounted recon);
A combat support company (mortars, heavy weapons, engineers, and maritime operations); and
A support company (transport, maintenance, quartermaster, and medical elements).

Such a task group could form the backbone of a Pacific Island Battalion, with additional infantry companies drawn from Pacific Island nations (alternatively, these could come from New Zealand or Australian regular/reserve units, or even from US, UK, Canadian, Irish, or other NATO partners). Three such task groups would provide the foundation for a brigade deployable anywhere across the Pacific.

Augmented with Ghost Shark maritime drones (alongside the expected helicopters and landing craft that a ship of this class would carry) the task group would constitute a highly versatile, lethal, and scalable combat formation — one intentionally designed for Pacific operations.

This concept points to a force structure with a different focus from the one that exists today. Within the land domain, it would place greater emphasis on asset-rich and technically complex combat support and support trades — particularly those required for a modern headquarters company. Within the sea domain it would see a pivot to multiple multi-role vessels to provide resilience. Within the Air domain we would see the addition of Pacific focused airframes that operate on shorter runaways.

Hard choices and trade-offs

Increasing investment in Pacific-focused defence capabilities will inevitably require that some less critical areas be deprioritised. Applying the proposed principles, there are some obvious candidates where funding could be reduced in order to redirect resources toward more fit-for-purpose capabilities. For example, should New Zealand really be spending $300–600 million on space, or is this an area where we should rely more on partners with greater capacity?

There are also less obvious capabilities that may warrant reconsideration. The Javelin missile system has proven its value many times over in Ukraine, but is it the best fit for the Pacific? Each Javelin command unit costs around $400,000, and every disposable missile is priced similarly. By contrast, the Carl Gustaf recoilless rifle costs roughly $35,000, with even its most expensive rounds costing only about $5,000 — delivering far greater firepower for the same investment.

In a theatre where vehicles are likely to be lightly armoured and engagements fought at shorter ranges, the Carl Gustaf may well provide more bang for buck.

A pivot required

There is certainly a lot more work to be done to consider the implications of the capabilities I have proposed, likewise the proposed principles are only an initial concept, but they hopefully demonstrate that getting the framework right will lead to a more cohesive and capable force.

New Zealand faces a choice. We can continue to tinker at the edges, replacing old assets with new ones, or we can intentionally design a Defence Force for the Pacific. That means tough decisions: trading frigates for multi-role ships, prioritising presence over prestige assets, and perhaps even considering a structural merger of the Services into a marine-oriented force optimised for littoral warfare.

New Zealand cannot afford incremental upgrades aimed at yesterday’s battles. It falls to the Minister of Defence to ask the right questions, set the right direction, and refocus the NZDF so we develop the capabilities New Zealand truly needs.

If the Minister fails to demand a decisive reset, our forces could be sent into harm’s way poorly equipped, under-prepared, and ill-matched to our likely partners’ capabilities — and the cost of that failure will be counted in lives.

In Depth: New Zealand Defence needs a Pacific-centric reset